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1. Introduction 
 
Two results appear as the most evident consequence of the ongoing process of economic integration 
occurring at regional and global levels: The completion of the Single Market Program in 1992, 
establishing the free movement of goods, capital, services and people as well, among the member 
states of the European Union (EU); The creation  of the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
concluding with the introduction of the Euro in 2002. This course of action is exemplified both by 
an increase in the degree of liberalization of capital markets, and the continuous removal of internal 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, with a consequent reduction of trade costs in product markets. Further 
developments and improvements in the Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP) and the financial 
market integration within the EU itself, have driven a significantly growth in the figures related to 
intra-industry trade (IIT) (see European Commission, 1996; 2008a) and intra-EU foreign direct 
investments (FDI) (see Bulletin EU 7/8, 2001; Jovanović, 2006, chap. 3, section 3.3.6; European 
Commission,  2008b).  
As long as product and capital markets became more integrated, it was expected that also major 
actors in European labor markets, as trade unions, start taking into account a broader perspective in 
their activities.  European trade unions have shown a  progressive  interest in trans-nationalize, 
usually in a softer way, the degree of cooperation in coordinating their policies and strategies in 
negotiations (the “Europeanization” of collective bargaining). In fact, for these purposes, the 
sharing of common rules in collective bargaining and institutions such as multinational collective 
bargains have been introduced, mainly by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).
1
Trade unions’ coordination activities are frequently present at national and intersectoral level, but 
they are well developed on a transnational scope at the industrial (sectoral) level.
  
2
While the practice of cross border company level negotiations seemed to be much less developed by 
trade unions until few years ago, some European Commission initiatives revitalized trade union’s 
interest in coordination activities also at this bargaining level. Among these initiatives, the adoption 
of the 1994 (recently reviewed in 2009) European Works Councils (EWC), and the 2001 European 
Company  (Socieatas Europea, SE) Directives,  which advanced the practice of informing and 
consulting the workforce in trans-national contexts, are notable. However, depending on the degree 
of market integration and the presence of productive activities organized internationally, there are 
remarkable distinctions among industries. In fact, in those sectors characterized by a high incidence 
of Multinational Enterprises (MNE) operations, company level negotiations are much more 
pronounced. In recent years trade unions began to exploit more intensively the potential of the 
 Front-runners 
among the European Industry Federations (EIFs)  are  the International Dock Workers Council 
(IDWC) and the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF). In particular, the former attempts to 
implement common rules in the bargaining process for its member partners: in 1998, the EMF 
passed a resolution stating that “the commitment to safeguard purchasing power and to reach a 
balanced participation in productivity gains is the new European coordination rule for coordinated 
collective bargaining in the metal sector all over Europe”. This evidently manifests the belief that 
wage coordination  at  European  level  will improve workers’  bargaining position,  avoiding a 
downward international competition in wages.  
                                                 
1 The “guideline for collective bargaining at the European level” by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
yearly provides, since 1998, indications regarding the positions that the negotiators of the confederate unions should 
maintain during the national bargaining processes. For a more complete review on coordination activities concerning 
collective bargaining, see European Commission (2002; 2009). 
2 However, analogous practices appeared also at interregional level: in 1998 the national trade unions of Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed an agreement (the “Doorn agreement”) which, in addition to wage 
demands, focused also in promoting employment growth. This was motivated by the opinion that long-standing wage 
moderation had led job growth in an unsatisfactory way. In coordinating workers representation at the centralized level 
on a transnational extent, the trade unions would guarantee the social dialogue characterizing the wage bargaining 
inside each state member that belongs to the Doorn group. Practically, trade union representatives of these countries 
meet annually and discuss how to coordinate respectively their national wage-setting practices.   3 
European Works Councils to coordinate across countries their activities during the bargaining 
process.  As a result, the figures related to cross border company agreements are expected to 
increase constantly: in fact, among the total of transnational agreements achieved in the last years, 
two thirds concern European MNEs activities within the EU itself (ETUC, 2007).
3 Even more 
recent is a further development of trade union practices: the creation of cross border unions. On 
Friday, 15
  May 2009, a “pioneering trans-boundary seafarers’ union” was launched, Nautilus 
International, based in the UK and the Netherlands and representing a wide range of personnel 
working in the shipping sector, at sea, on inland waterways, and ashore. The new cross border union 
is the result of a merger process following several years of progressively closer cooperation 
between Nautilus NL and Nautilus UK. This cooperation includes joint industrial negotiations with 
companies employing British and Dutch members, and a united approach at European and 
international level on different issues related to maritime industry. Although at an embryonic state, 
in prospect this practice may affect firms’ choice related to the internationalization of their 
activities. In fact, the potential MNE which would like to take strategically advantage of this 
organizational structure to circumvent  the creation of an encompassing union, as Horn and 
Wolinsky (1988) suggest, may probably face a unique workers’ representative body inside the 
company.
4
Despite its broad importance in the study of the effects of globalization and “Europeanization” on 
the institutions governing the EU labor markets and the relative outcomes (wage and employment 
levels), trade unions’ incentives and scopes for cooperative behavior in a framework of international 
product market integration is in some way a new subject in economic analysis. This work focuses 
precisely on these issues, extending the earlier literature investigating if unions are able to affect 
firms’ decision related to the start of international business, and consequently the productive 
structures of different countries.
 
5
This paper relates to a body of literature that analyzes, though within different contexts,  the 
implications of international economic integration on labor markets outcomes in presence of unions. 
Nonetheless, few works have investigated how union strategic behavior is affected by this process 
and how unions behavior may in turns affect firms’ strategic choice related to international 
activities. A first strand which examines how international integration affects the wage formation in 
presence of unionized countries is represented by Huizinga (1993), Sørensen (1993), Naylor (1998, 
1999), Borghijs and Du Caju (1999), Straume  (2002),  Lommerud and al. (2003), Ishida and 
Matsushima (2008),  and Strozzi (2007, 2008).  
  
Authors such as Huizinga (1993), making use of a monopoly union model, and Sørensen (1993), 
utilizing a  more general right-to-manage  model,  concluded  that product market integration, 
exemplified by the merger of two single union-firm bargaining units into a unified market with two 
bargaining units, leads to an enlargement of the market size, as well as in an increase in the number 
of the firms which operates in the market that intensify the degree of competition. This in turns 
implies a decrease in the level of prices and wages. Moreover, under the assumption of linear 
demand and production functions, Huizinga (1993) obtains that the decrease in wage levels is more 
than offset by the increase in employment so that net union utility increases. Nonetheless these two 
                                                 
3 For an exposition on the evidences of trans-national unionism in Europe see  Borghijs, Ederveen and De Mooij (2003), 
Strozzi (2008, Ch. 2), and European Commission (2009).  On collective bargaining in MNEs see also Eurofound 
(2009).).      
4 A brief discussion on cross border trade unions can be found in Gennard (2009). 
5 Additionally, the creation of a “labor unions’ cartel” could theoretically represent an anticompetitive price overcharge 
which has been commonly used as a basis for computing damages claims in price-fixing cartels. The European antitrust 
authorities have  recently shown a renewed interest in properly assessing cartel damages, including the possible 
consideration of the passing-on defense and the legal standing of indirect purchaser or class actions for consumers 
(Green Paper on private cartel damages and the possibility of a passing on defense by the European Commission, 2005).  
Consequently, in theoretical lines, in future it could be the case that consumers have the possibility to present a class 
action against trade unions. On pass-through in damage actions and the possibility of passing-on defense, see i.a. 
Verboven and van Dijk (2007) and Boone and Müller (2008).    4 
models do not take into account  any kind of interaction between the two economies before 
integration occurs, and the incentives for international cooperation between labor unions are only 
concisely drawn. 
Closely related to this work are the contributions of Naylor (1998, 1999), Borghijs and Du Caju 
(1999),  Straume  (2002) and Strozzi  (2007, 2008). In  Naylor (1998, 1999)  two identical firms 
initially produce a homogeneous product for their home markets and, under the assumption of 
perfect symmetry in both product and labour market, they engage in reciprocal dumping when trade 
cost levels falls below a threshold value. This implies a fall in the wage demands by labor unions: 
intra-industry trade, putting union in competition internationally in the labor  market, erodes 
drastically their monopoly power. But, as long as the degree of economic integration increases 
(additional reduction in trade costs), unions set higher wages due to higher profits for both firms, 
capturing part of firms’ rent. In these works, in particular Naylor (1999), the effects of economic 
integration on wages and unions’ outcomes and the  interaction between the two economies, 
exemplified by the labor unions’  strategic behavior in the labor markets, are deeply explored. 
However, also in Naylor’s studies, there is a lack in the analysis for the scope and incentives for 
international cooperation between labor unions.   
Incentives for labor union cooperation at trans-national level are deeply explored in Borghijs and 
Du Caju (1999), Straume (2002), and Strozzi (2007, 2008). Borghijs and Du Caju (1999) analyze 
the possibility for labor union cooperation within a context of international production. Starting 
from a very basic set up of internationalization of productive activities with a firm having two 
plants in different countries and product markets fully integrated, these authors find that if one 
union demands a wage rate too high, there is a production shift to the other plant. Assuming the 
presence of a transaction cost reflecting the labor unions’ costs of trans-national cooperation in 
wage demands, the main results are that for coordination costs sufficiently high, unions act as 
competitors on the labor market and consequently moderate their wage demands. Below a certain 
threshold value of coordination costs, to cooperate turns out to be increasingly attractive for labor 
unions, which translates in a raise in wages. A further decrease in the value of coordination costs 
reduces wage rates, but the collusive wage still remains higher than the competitive wage. 
Conversely, the works of Straume (2002) and Strozzi (2007, 2008) analyze the scope for unions to 
adopt a collusive behavior within a context of a standard international duopoly game with reciprocal 
dumping and how this behavior could be supported as equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game. 
While  Straume  (2002),  making  use of the basic analytical framework of  Naylor (1998, 1999), 
investigates the case of perfect substitute goods, Strozzi  (2007, 2008) broadens the analysis 
introducing a degree of complementary/substitutability between products.  
The papers of Lommerud and al. (2003) and Ishida and Matsushima (2008) are strictly related to 
this work . Lommerud and al. (2003) makes use of a two-country reciprocal dumping model of 
oligopoly with only one country unionized, focusing the analysis on how trade liberalisation and 
wage setting affects the firms’ location choice, and therefore the way firms choose to serve their 
relevant markets.  While Lommerud and al. (2003) consider the presence of one firm in each 
country, in a similar framework Ishida and Matsushima (2008) analyze the same issue when in one 
country there is domestic competition between firms. Hence, in these works the strategic interaction 
in the labor markets is absent, and consequently there is no room for the study of trade union 
cooperation. 
A second strand of the literature analyzes the interaction between unionized labor markets and firm 
activities related to the internationalization of production through FDI.  The general approach 
investigates  the impact of FDI  examining the union-firm interaction using either a “right-to-
manage” (Boughin and Vannini, 1995; Naylor and Santoni, 2003; Eckel and Egger, 2009) or an 
efficient bargaining model (Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991; Zhao,  1995;  1998) to explore the 
effects on wages and employment, either in a partial or in a general equilibrium framework. As in 
the works of Naylor and Santoni (2003), Zhao (1995) and Eckel and Egger (2009), also in the 
present paper intra-industry reciprocal FDI and the presence of unions in the labor market are   5 
allowed. Notwithstanding the different approaches, underlying hypothesis and purposes of analysis, 
these models achieve a common result: if firms have the opportunity to invest in a foreign country, 
they will cause a moderation in wage demands in the bargaining process, and consequently unions’ 
position appears to be weakened. Nevertheless, none of these works considers the possibility of 
union collusive behavior.  
The present paper contributes to the previous literature in a twofold manner. First, as in the works 
of Lommerud et al. (2003) and Ishida and Matsushima (2008), it widens Naylor’s analysis by 
allowing firms to undertake FDI.  However,  differently from these authors,  a model where the 
workforce is unionized in both countries is used, which reflects better the characteristics of the EU 
labor market. In doing so, this work tries to create a link between two issues that in the previous 
literature have been mainly treated as separated subjects, giving some plausible predictions both for 
labor market outcomes and the nature of potential international business in an environment like the 
EU. Second, it analyzes the scope and incentives for unions to adopt a collusive behavior for each 
possible configuration of international activities, if and how this may affect the choice concerning 
the nature of international business by firms, and within which context union collusion is more 
likely to be sustained. For the purposes of this paper, a framework adapted from Straume (2002) is 
used, which becomes a sub-case of a more general model.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 outlines the analytical framework: 
a non-cooperative three-stage game of international duopoly in presence of unionized labor markets 
is presented. Firms act as first movers choosing independently if to invest in the foreign country, 
paying a certain level of sunk costs, or not to invest: in that case, they may either export toward the 
foreign country or produce exclusively for their domestic country. Then in the second stage, trade 
unions, depending on firms’ choice and trade cost levels, select their optimal wage strategy. The 
model is solved by the usual backward induction method and it is shown how, depending on sunk 
and trade costs, and due to the strategic interaction between firms and unions, different productive 
structures may arise in equilibrium. Section 3, making use of the same framework, extends the 
analysis to the case of union collusive behavior. Some comparative static are used to evaluate the 
profitability of wage collusion in most of the possible productive structure configurations. Instead, 
Section 4 provides an examination of the sustainability of union collusion in all the potential 
equilibria that might occur under this behavior. Section 5 briefly discusses the national welfare 
aspects of economic integration, firms’ strategic behavior and unionization within the model; some 
policy implications are drawn. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
 
There are two fully symmetric countries, A and B. In each country the economy presents two 
sectors: a perfectly competitive sector, and an imperfectly competitive sector characterized by the 
presence of a monopolist, firm 1, located in A, and firm 2 located in B. The two firms produce a 
homogeneous good, denoted x when produced in A and  y  when produced in B, and consider each 
country as a separate market (market segmentation hypothesis). Labor is the unique factor of 
production, with linear technology and constant return to scale. Under these assumptions it follows 
that each worker produces one unit of the good: therefore, production and employment may be 
taken interchangeably. The perfectly competitive sector represents a buffer, where workers can 
always find employment at the competitive wage (normalized to zero). A crucial assumption of the 
model is the presence of company level unions organizing their activities in the imperfectly 
competitive sector, whose workers are supposed to be fully unionized.  
In the first stage of the game, firms independently choose whether to invest, undertaking FDI and 
establishing a production plant in the other country: this implies that the firm incurs a fixed cost F ; 
or not to invest: in that case, depending on the level of t and unions’ strategies, firms might either 
to serve the other country through exports, paying a constant cost t per unit of the commodity 
exported, or to produce only for the domestic market.    6 
Table 1: First stage, the Firms’ Game 
                       Firm 1         Firm 2→ 
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2 Π  
 
In the second stage, monopoly unions (see  Dowrick,  1989) set their optimal wage strategies. 
Finally, in the third stage, firms are engaged in a Cournot competition,
6
The model is solved in the usual backward fashion: Firstly, the Cournot competition between firms 
in the product market is analyzed; Secondly, the unions’ strategic behavior in the labor market; 
Finally, turning back to the first stage, it will be considered which equilibria arise and under which 
conditions. 
 choosing profit-maximizing 
quantities separately for each market. Market segmentation, combined with the constant marginal 
costs assumption, implies that the price of the good in each country depends exclusively on the total 
quantity available in the market. 
 
2.1 Stage 1: payoffs’ description 
 
In the first stage each firm has two strategies,
7 as shown in Table 1: to invest in the foreign country, 
setting a new plant; and not to invest, maintaining all productive activities in the domestic country. 
As a consequence, several regimes might potentially arise: i) Reciprocal FDI (RFDI) when both 
firms invest; ii) two asymmetric regimes where only one firm invests; in this case, depending on 
trade costs and union strategies, the firm which does not invest might either to export or to produce 
only for the domestic market; iii) both firms do not invest: again, depending on trade cost levels and 
unions’ strategic decisions, it may be that firms either serve the other market through exports, 
allowing for intra-industry trade (IIT), or they will remain in “autarky”, usually defined in the 
literature as a situation where a firm produces just for its domestic market.
8
In Table 1, 
  
II Π  denotes RFDI profits; 
IN Π  (
NI Π ) denotes profits when a firm undertakes direct 
investment while the other does not (and vice versa); 
NN Π  profits when both firms do not invest. 
The first lower script indicates the firm while the second denotes the country where firm profits are 









B F F 2 1 =  where  B F1 ) ( 2A F  represents the sunk cost that Firm 1 (Firm 2) faces when it makes 
investment in country B (A). Obviously, depending on the different strategy adopted by the rival 
firm, the amount of the sunk costs needed to invest in the foreign country will vary according to the 
strategy profile. It turns out that to invest is a strategically viable option if profits generated by firms 








B F1 2 ≥ Π ) in 








B F2 2 ≥ Π ) in the asymmetric regimes. It is also retained all 
through the paper the assumption  that the sunk costs are not subsidized, in the sense that firms do 
not receive money from the host government to locate a plant inside their country, namely 0 ≥ F .  
In the next subsections the sub-games (first quantities and then wage outcomes) relatively to all 
regimes will be inspected to determine the union wage strategy selection in labor markets. The 
                                                 
6 As Brander (1981) pointed out, it might unquestionably be argued that the adoption of the Cournot strategy in product 
market by firm is unrealistic, but very sophisticated strategies are unlikely to be pursued because of high information-
gathering and processing costs. Hence, in this paper, to make use of a very simple strategy could be useful for easiness 
of exposition.  
7 In this paper only pure strategies are taken in consideration. 
8 In principle, there are two additional outcomes in this sub-case, namely the one-way trade regimes. But, as Naylor 
(1999) has shown, when both markets are unionized and it is retained the symmetry assumption, one-way trade is never 
given.   7 
results obtained will allow to evaluate firms’ payoff in the first stage, and therefore to derive all the 
possible productive structures that will arise as game equilibria.   
 
2.2 Case 1: both firms do not invest 
 
In the first sub-case is analyzed the situation in which both firms decide not to invest. The results of 
this subsection are also found in Straume (2002) and Naylor (1998, 1999) which are the strict 
references for this part of the paper. 
 
2.2.1 Monopoly in Autarky 
 
The monopoly in the case of Autarky is used as benchmark. Consider country A and Firm 1. The 
monopolist profit function is given by  
 
x w x x 1 1 ) 1 ( − − = Π                          (1) 
 
where  ) 1 ( x p − =  is the linear (inverse) demand function (a is normalized to 1) and  1 w  is the 






w x − = . 
 
The union utility function is the following 
 
x w1 1 = Ω                           (2) 
 
Substituting x and solving the maximization problem, the optimal wage is then obtained 
 
2 1 = M w                           (3) 
 
where the lower script M  denotes “monopoly”. Further substitutions yield 
 
y x = = 4 1 ,  8 1 = ΩM ,  16 1 = Π M ,  32 1 = M CS , 32 7 = M NW  
 
representing respectively the values for employment, union utility, profits, consumer surplus and 
national welfare. Given symmetry, the situation is identical in both countries. 
 
2.2.2 Intra-industry Trade with Bertrand Competition between Unions 
 
In case of intra-industry trade, in the last stage of the game firms are engaged in a Cournot 
competition in the product markets. The profit functions are given by 
 
B B A B B B A A A tx x w x w x y x x y x 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − − − + − − = Π           (4) 
 
A B A B B B A A A ty y w y w y y x y y x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − − − + − − = Π            (5) 
 
where  A A A y x p 2 1 1 − − =   is  the price for the good in country A which depends both on the 
quantity produced by Firm 1 for the domestic market and the quantity produced for exports by Firm 
2. Similarly  B B B y x p 2 1 1 − − =  is the price for the good in B. Notice that both firms pay a cost   8 
[ ) 1 , 0 ∈ t  per unit of the good exported representing a basket of costs including tariffs, transportation 
and logistic, etc. Optimal quantities for Firm 1, subject obviously to the non-negativity constraints, 
are then  
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for domestic market and  
 








w w t x B − + − =  
 
for export quantities. Similarly, for Firm 2 it is obtained  
 








w w t y B − + + =  
 
for domestic market and  
 








w w t y A − + − =  
 
for exports. Firms’ decision concerning export significantly depends on trade costs: firms would 
find profitable to export only if these costs are sufficiently small for intra-industry trade to 
contribute positively to profits. Subsequently, given the optimal quantities (and hence employment 
levels), each union sets the wage engaging in Bertrand competition against the other firm-level 
union. The utility function for Union 1 is given by 
 
) ( 1 1 1 1 B A x x w + = Ω .                       (6) 
 
A similar utility function holds for Union 2. Substituting quantities into union utility function, the 








w t w + − =  
 
which represents the reaction function for union 1. Identical expression (interchanging  1 w  with  2 w )           
is obtained for union 2. The equilibrium wage level in Bertrand competition is then given by 
 




, − = .                        (7) 
 
In case of intra-industry trade, unions compete between them over employment, causing a fall in  
wage levels compared to autarky regime. Hence trade, within this model, deteriorates union power. 
Nevertheless  0 / , < ∂ ∂ t w IIT BC : an increase in economic integration will induce trade unions to raise 
wages. The intuition is the following. For values less than a certain threshold (see below), IIT 
occurs between the two countries. A decrease in trade cost levels will induce a harsher competition 
amongst the participants in the international oligopoly: firms’ output rises because exports increase; 
consequently, labor demand increases as well, and therefore unions will choose to set higher wages, 
capturing a higher share of oligopoly rents, while firms may experience a loss in profits.    9 
Putting equation (7) into the quantity expressions allows to compute the following values: 
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which are the optimal Cournot quantities. After subsequent substitutions the union utility, firm 
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2.2.3 Second stage: unions’ strategy selection 
 
It should be noted that the optimal strategy selection by unions between a high-wage strategy, 
inducing autarky, and a low-wage strategy, allowing for IIT, depends exclusively on trade cost 
levels. IIT is supported in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if the level of trade costs is below a 
particular critical value, given by   31 . ) 2 9 13 ( 8 ≈ + ≤ t  as shown in Naylor (1998, Appendix). 
Note that, as Naylor (1999) proves,  in a symmetric unionized framework, inside  the range 
354 . 31 . < < t  there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, with  354 . = t  representing the prohibitive 
trade cost levels at which trade no longer occurs: for higher values, unions will set a wage level 




2.3 Case 2: both firms invest. International Production with Bertrand Competition between Unions 
 
If both firms reciprocally invest into the other country, the RFDI regime is given. Firms’ profit 
functions are then the following 
  
F y w x w y y y x x x B A B B B A A A − − − − − + − − = Π 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (           (8) 
 
F y w x w y y y x x x B A B B B A A A − − − − − + − − = Π 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 (           (9) 
  
where  A A A x x p 2 1 1 − − =   is the price for the good in country A which depends both on the 
quantity produced by Firm 1 in country A and the quantity produced by the branch located in the 
same country by Firm 2. Similarly,  B B B y y p 2 1 1 − − =  is the price for the good in B. Notice that, 
when firms become multinational, they will pay the same wage in both countries: this hypothesis is 
coherent with the idea, frequently found in the literature, that a multinational will pay a wage rate 
different from that of domestic firms, see i.e. Leahy and Montagna (2000). 
                                                 
9 National welfare is defined as the sum of profits generated by the national firm (in case of international production 
offshore profits are obviously repatriated), union rents generated inside a country, consumers’ surplus and, in the case 
of  exports, tariff revenues. As Naylor (1998) pointed out, if t  is interpreted as partly comprising transport, logistic and 
other transaction costs, T  should not fully enter in the definition of the national welfare. For easiness of exposition, it 
will be assumed that the fraction of  t  related to transport is negligible with respect to the tariff part.    
10 It can be shown that in the subsystem represented by firm profits related to production in country A (B),  firm’s  2 (1) 
profits from exports correlated to the optimal union 1 (2) high-low wage strategy will be positive for  714 . 7 5 ≈ ≤ t  
and   588 . 17 10 ≈ ≤ t , respectively. But these values are greater than  31 . ≤ t  and  354 . = t  which represent two more 
stringent restrictions on firms profit functions.   10 
Cournot competition outcomes in stage 3 of the game yield the following expression for quantities 


















































In presence of competition in the product markets, the following labor demand functions in terms of 
the two wage levels are derived 
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Equations (10)-(13) represent the production boundaries shown in Figure 1: given that the 
multinationals will pay the same wage in both countries, it turns out that if unions set too high wage 
levels (regions II and III in Figure 1) not only they do not consent to invest, but they also price out 
the firm from the domestic market, condemning their workers out of the labor markets. Hence, in 
stage 2 of the game each company-level union chooses a wage allowing firms both for domestic 
production and foreign investment. Making use of the optimal quantities, the utility function for 
Union 1 is given by   
 
) ( 1 1 1 1 B A y x w + = Ω                       (14) 
 
and the utility function for Union 2 takes a similar form.
11
 
 Substitution of (10) and (11) into (14), 





w w + =  
 
                                                 
11 Obviously in this model each union, given its firm-level nature, is implicitly assumed to operate and coordinate its 
activities at company level in both countries.   11 
Figure 1: Investment Boundaries and Unions’ Reaction Functions  
 
 
which is the reaction function for Union 1. A similar result (interchanging  1 w  with  2 w ) is obtained 
for Union 2. Putting each of the two expressions into the other, the equilibrium wage level in 
Bertrand competition is derived,  
 
  3 1 , = RFDI BC w                         (15) 
 
where the lower script indicates “Bertrand Competition in RFDI regime”. It follows that production 
levels are given by 
 
9 2 2 2 1 1 = = = = A B B A x y y x  
 
In the case of international business it is immediately clear that,  when comparing wages (see 
equations (15) and (7)) and production outcomes, unions in equilibrium get for both higher values 
in a RFDI regime with respect to IIT reaching,  consequently a higher utility level. This is so 
because unions will be able to capture a higher share of firm rents derived from the trade cost 
savings. Therefore the firm investment strategy will be advantageous for company level unions 
which may welcome FDI.  
After subsequent substitutions, the union utility, firm profits, the expression for consumer surplus 
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2.4 Case 3: only one firm invests. Asymmetric regimes 
 
To establish where a particular equilibrium of the game is given, it is also required to evaluate 
firms’ profits in asymmetric regimes, namely when one firm adopts the investment strategy while 
the other firm does not the same. In these asymmetric regimes, depending on unions high-low wage 
strategies, different configurations in both the product and the labor markets are possible. To define 
all the possible scenarios, consider for example the case that Firm 1 does not invest while Firm 2 
undertakes a FDI. In the general case, profit function expressions are then the following: 
 
B B A B B B A A A tx x w x w x y x x x x 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − − − + − − = Π         (16) 
 
F y w x w y y x x x x B A B B B A A A − − − − − + − − = Π 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 (         (17)   12 
where  A A A x x p 2 1 1 − − =  is the price for the good in country A which depends both on quantities 
produced by Firm 1 and the quantities eventually produced by the subsidiary located in the same 
country by Firm 2, while  B B B y x p 2 1 1 − − = , the price of the good in B, depends on the quantity 
eventually imported  by country B  from Firm 1 and the quantity produced by Firm 2 for its 
originally domestic market B. Cournot competition in this case gives the following expressions for 
















































= , for   0 1 = A x ,  0 2 ≥ A x  only if  1 2 ≤ w           (21) 
 
Expressions (18) to (21) represent the absolute upper bounds in absence of competition in the 
product markets in asymmetric regimes. But if wages set by unions are such that firms may 
compete, then the optimal Cournot quantities in terms of union wage rates are given by  
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All the boundary conditions and the possible asymmetric configurations are depicted in Figure 2. 
Consider for example the boundary expression in (23): Firm 1 exports for rates of  1 w  lower than the 
boundary expression. This expression binds until  1 2 < w , while for higher values of  2 w  such that 
0 2 = B y , then  t w − ≤ 1 1   binds. Instead, consider the boundary expression in (24): home 
production for Firm 2 along the boundary is exactly equal to zero. This constraint binds until 
exports by Firm 1 are strictly positive, that is, for  t w − < 1 1 . For  higher values of  1 w ,  0 1 = B x ; 
then boundary constraint in (20),  1 2 ≤ w , binds. With a similar reasoning, all the other boundaries 
are derived. 
The boundary conditions generate six potential qualitatively different possible output regions, three 
involving trade, and three FDI. In Region I all quantities are positive. This region is related to 
values of wages  sufficiently low such that both firms are allowed to undertake international 
business, either in the form of exports or FDI. In Region II,  1 w  is high enough, given  2 w  and t, that    13 
Figure 2: Trade and Investment Boundaries and Possible  
Configurations In Asymmetric Regimes  
 
 
Firm 1 cannot export: in this case only Firm 2 undertakes international business in the way of FDI, 
while  1 w  is still sufficiently low to ensure that Firm 1 produces retaining only a share for its original 
domestic market. Region III, instead, is characterized by a situation where the wage level fixed by 
the Union 2,  2 w , given  1 w  and  t, is prohibitive to consent Firm 2 to exploit the production plant 
located in the other country, but it is still sufficiently low to allow exclusively domestic production. 
In Region IV (and similarly in Region V),  1 w  ( 2 w ) is so high that Firm 2 (Firm 1) establishes a 
monopoly in both markets. Regions I, II, III, IV and V embrace types of configurations where forms 
of international activities are engaged. In Region VI, in contrast, no international business occurs 
and firms produce only domestically.
12
From equations (18) to (25) it follows that, depending on the particular region, labor demand 
functions for each union will differ, and consequently the best-reply functions (and the relative 
utility levels associated) of each of them with respect to the high-low wage strategy played by the 
rival union. In order to find the sub-game  equilibria  in asymmetric regimes, some preliminary 
consideration are exploited. First, unions will never set wages that will priced out the firm from the 
product market, that is, in the case under consideration, Union 1 will never play wage  levels 
residing along the boundary between Region II and IV and in Region IV, while Union 2 will never 
play wage levels along the boundary between Region III and V and in Region V. Second, the 
following result is derived.  
  
 
Proposition 1: In asymmetric regimes, the union in the firm which invests does not play a high 
wage strategy. 
 
Proof: see the appendix.  
 
Proposition 1 establishes that, whenever a firm has chosen to invest, the relevant union’s best reply 
function is that associated to the low wage strategy: although there may be the possibility, the union 
will never set a wage which precludes the exploitation of the foreign plant result of the FDI. The 
reason lies in the fact that high wage rates are not sufficient to compensate the drastic loss in 
employment opportunities for the union in the foreign country: FDI will induce unions to moderate 
wage demands with respect to the autarky position, but this is more than offset by the occupational 
growth. It follows that, in the case under exam, Union 2 will never play wage levels in Region III. 
                                                 
12 Theoretically there are two other regions (not depicted in the figure): a region where wage rates are so high that in 
country B there is neither production nor consumption , but  1 w  is sufficiently low to produce in country A; and a region 
where wage rates are so high that in both countries there is there is neither production nor consumption.    14 
From this discussion, the analysis concerning the determination of sub-game equilibria candidates 
in asymmetric regimes can be restricted to Regions I and II. 
 
2.4.1 Region I 
 
As earlier said, Region I is characterized by values of wage rates sufficiently low to consent also  
Firm 1 to undertake international business in the form of exports.  Hence, the labor demand 
functions faced by the two unions are given by  the sum of (22) and (23) for Union 1  
 
) 2 2 4 2 (
3
1
2 1 1 1 t w w x x B A − + − = +                 (26) 
 
and (24) and (25) for union 2, that is  
 
) 2 4 2 (
3
1
1 2 2 2 t w w x y A B + + − = + .                (27) 
 
From (26) and (27) it is suddenly evident that total employment and production levels of the 
multinational are greater than those of the exporting firm. This is due to the effect of the saving in 
trade costs by the multinational. Additionally, these “trade barriers” act as a kind of protection with 
respect to “home” workers of Firm 2, as it is possible to see from equation (24). 
Utility function in this case for Union 1 is given by   
 
) ( 1 1 1 1 B A x x w + = Ω                       (28) 
 
while for Union 2 is given by   
 
) ( 2 2 2 2 B A y x w + = Ω .                    (29) 
 
The optimal utility related to the low-wage strategy for Union 1, that is, the wage level allowing for 
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where the first expression in (30) is the reaction function of Union 1 in region 1, 
L
I RF , 1 . Similarly, 
for Union 2 it is obtained  { } I
w
w , 2 2
2
max arg Ω = , which yields the reaction function  
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Using (30) and (31) the following wage levels in equilibrium for each union are obtained 
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After further substitutions of equilibrium wages, optimal quantities are obtained  
 
















2 − = .  
 
It is immediately evident that t plays a different role on wage levels, depending on the type of 
international economic activity the firm has undertaken. In fact, increasing economic integration (in 
the form of a further reduction in barriers to trade) stimulates exports and implies an increase in 
wages for the union which operates in the exporting firm, while a higher degree of economic 
integration translates both in a decrease in the multinational firm production and in a reduction in 
wages for its workers. Nonetheless, wages and output in the multinational firm are always higher 
than those in the exporting firm, unless  0 = t : the union in the multinational is able to capture 
higher shares of the firm’s rents generated by the savings in trade costs.   
Finally, subsequent substitutions of equilibrium wages and quantities lead to all the other values for 
union utility level, firms’ profit functions, consumers’ surplus and for national welfare in the case of 
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2.4.2 Region II 
               
In Region II  1 w  is sufficiently high, given  2 w  and t, that Firm 1 cannot export. The labor demand 
functions faced by the two unions are given by (22) for Union 1 and by the sum of (20) with 
0 1 = B x  and (25) for Union 2, that is  
 
) 2 7 5 (
6
1
1 2 2 2 w w x y A B + − = + .                  (34) 
 
Hence union utility functions are given by  
 
A x w 1 1 1 = Ω                         (35) 
 
) ( 2 2 2 2 B A y x w + = Ω .                    (36) 
                                                 
13 Note that in the expression of national welfare are computed union rents generated inside the country, that is, union 
rents assigned to all workers that operates in a country.    16 
Since Union 1 in Region II is playing a high wage strategy while Union 2 play a low wage strategy, 
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and  for Union 2,  { } II
w
w , 2 2
2
max arg Ω = , from which it is obtained 
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II + = Ω .                    (38) 
 
To complete the analysis relatively to Region II, at the boundary between Region I and II it is 
obtained that (27) is equal to (34), that is,  
 
1 2 2 1 2 − + = t w w                       (39) 
 
which is consistent with (23), and represents Union 2 reaction function along the boundary. Using  
Cournot quantities and (37) and (38) it is derived 
 
54 19 , , 1 = nt Asy BC w                       (40) 
 
27 11 , , 2 = nt Asy BC w                       (41) 
 
where low script indicate “Bertrand Competition in Asymmetric Regime, no trade”. The resulting 
wage levels in equilibrium are obviously independent on trade cost. It is important to note that wage 
rates in both countries are now higher with respect to the case of reciprocal investment: the mere 
fact that one firm decides not to invest allows unions to recover part of their monopoly power 
because of a reduced competition, obtaining a higher wage. Making use of (40) and (41), the 
optimal quantities produced are derived 
 
81 19 1 = A x ;  27 8 2 = B y ,  162 29 2 = A x  
 
and, after subsequent substitutions, the union utility level, firm profits, the expression for consumer 
surplus and finally the value for national welfare
14
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2.4.3 Second stage: Union 1 strategy selection 
 
While Union 2 will always select a wage level such that Firm 2 can operate in both markets, 
                                                 
14 Notice that in the national welfare of country A is computed also the share of union rents obtained by workers of the 
Firm 2 employed in country A.   17 
Figure 3: Trade and Investment Boundaries and  
Unions’ Reaction Functions in Asymmetric Regimes 
 
 
Union 1 in the not investing firm has the opportunity to choose between a high-low wage strategy. 




I , 1 , 1 Ω ≥ Ω , that is, from 
equations (30) and (37), at the wage level  
 
1 ) 2 2 ( 2 − + ≥ t w . 
 
The switching wage for Union 1 matches the point of intersection of the low-wage part of the Union 
1 reaction function with the best reply for Union 2 in Region I,  I RF , 2 , when satisfying concurrently 
with the Bertrand equilibrium wage in equation (33); it follows that the critical value of t, above 
which trade in asymmetric regimes is not supported as pure strategy equilibrium, is equal to 
 





− + ≥ + t t  
 
that is, at the critical value of trade cost levels  398 . ) 2 15 29 ( 20 ≈ + ≤ t . Instead, the switching 
wage for Union 1 matches the point of intersection of the high-wage part of the Union 1 reaction 
function with the best reply for Union 2 in Region II ( II RF , 2   in Figure 3) when fulfilling 
simultaneously with the Bertrand equilibrium wage in equation (40); consequently the critical value 
of t above which home production in asymmetric regimes is given as equilibrium in pure strategies 
is equal to 
 
1 ) 2 2 ( 27 11 − + ≤ t  
 
that is, at the critical value of trade cost level  412 . ) 2 2 ( 27 38 ≈ + ≥ t . 
From these results directly follows that if  398 . ≤ t , then Union 1 will set unambiguously a wage 
level which allows Firm 1 to export in the other country, while for  412 . ≥ t , Union 1 will set 
unequivocally a wage level that induces Firm 1 to produce only domestically. What happens in the 
range  412 . 398 . < < t ? This could be also exemplified graphically in Figure 3, which describes 
unions’ best reply functions. 
For  t  marginally  above  the critical value  398 . ,  equilibrium defined by (33)-(34)  is not given 
because Union 1 would switch to a high-wage strategy. When Union 1 switches to a high-wage 
strategy (
H
II RF , 1  in Figure 3), then Union’s 2 wage raises under the best response function in Region 
I, 
L
I RF , 2 . At the new level of wage rate set by Union 2, Union 1 will respond under the revised best   18 
response function, but the process does not converge. Instead, for t below the critical value  412 . , 
equilibrium defined by (41)-(42) is not given and Union 1 will play a low-wage strategy. Once 
again, the best response by Union 2 is such that at the new wage level  2 w , the process does not 
converge: the best response functions in the range  412 . 398 . < < t  do not intersect. It follows that, 
in such a range, a sub-game equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. 
 
2.5 First stage: Firms’ Selection Strategy and Game Equilibria under Union Competition 
 
It is now possible to go back to the first stage of the game to investigate the strategies selected by 
firms. Depending both on trade and investment costs, and wage levels selected by unions, under 
certain conditions different productive structures  might arise as equilibria of the game.  
It was found that in the sub-game defined by the firms’ strategy profile  ) ; ( N N , IIT is supported as 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies by unions if the trade cost level is below  31 . ≤ t ; for  354 . > t  
unions’ optimal wage strategy is to set high wages such that firms are induced to produce only for 
the domestic markets; in the range  354 . 31 . < < t ,  there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Instead, firms’ payoffs in the RFDI regime depend on wage levels set by unions and the amount of 
fixed costs.  
Conversely, in the two sub-games identified by the firms’ strategy profiles  ) ; ( N I  and  ) ; ( I N , 
depending on t,  F  and the union wage strategy in the firm which does not invest,
15
398 . ≤ t
 two different 
asymmetric regimes are possible. If  , then the union in the firm which maintain all 
productive activities at home will set a wage level such that the firm would export towards the other 
country, while for  412 . ≥ t  the union will choose unequivocally a wage rate inducing only home 
production. In the range  412 . 398 . < < t , there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.   
To obtain well defined solutions in pure strategies, in the subsequent analysis the following 
restrictions on the values of the parameters are imposed. 
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While Restriction 1 simply allows to delimitate the ranges  of the trade costs where sub-game 
perfect equilibria in the union game are existent, the meaning of Restriction 2 is that the profits 
generated in the foreign market by the firm which invests have to be greater than the size of the 
fixed costs to undertake the investment in the foreign country. These profits will differ according to 
the strategy selected by the rival firm: hence, Restriction 2 defines a set where the investment 
strategy can be played either when both firms invest or when only one firm makes a foreign 
investment.
16
Making use of the results of stages 2 and 3 and given Restrictions 1 and 2, it follows that firms’ 
payoff structure in stage 1 of the game are represented by  
  
 
1) in 31 . 0 ≤ ≤ t : 
 
















IIT BC Π Π ;  
 
                                                 
15 In fact, from Proposition 1, the union operating in the firm which decided to become multinational will always set a 
wage such that the plants in both countries are exploited. 
16 If restriction 2 does not hold, the investment strategy is not always practicable, and hence the results of the analysis 
are those obtained in Naylor (1999).   19 
Figure 4: Firm Profits in Stage 1 
 
      Note: bold lines represent profit functions associated to the FDI strategy 
 
2) in  398 . 354 . ≤ < t : 
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3) for  412 . ≥ t : 
 
















M Π Π . 
 
The situation is exemplified in Figure 4, while game equilibria are reported in Table 2. In the range 
31 . 0 ≤ ≤ t  it is obtained that the size of sunk costs must be 
 
[ ] ) ; min( , 0 , , , 1 , , 1 1
IN
tr Asy BC B
II
RFDI BC B B F Π Π ∈ and  [ ] ) ; min( , 0 , , , 2 , , 2 2
IN
tr Asy BC A
II
RFDI BC A A F Π Π ∈  
 




RFDI BC B   and  8100 ) 20 11 (
2
, , , 2 , , , 1 − = Π = Π t
IN
tr Asy BC A
IN
tr Asy BC B .                
It can be easily checked that all over this range of analysis, 
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with the equality holding only for  0 = t .  Hence, the  relevant range of F   is given by 
[ ] 31 . , , , 2 , , , 1 ) ( , 0 = Π = Π ∈ t
IN
tr Asy BC A
IN
tr Asy BC B F : in fact, at the upper bound of this interval, profits 
associated to asymmetric structures of international activities are the lowest for the firm which 
invests, allowing for FDI at every value of t whenever sunk costs are lower than this threshold. 
When  0 = F   (direct investment no costly) and unions act competitively, in the range 
297 . 471 140 0 ≈ ≤ < t , RFDI is the Nash equilibrium of the game, while for  471 140 > t  both 
RFDI and IIT are given. As long as the magnitude of the sunk costs for the direct investment F  
will vary, the profit function associated to FDI goes down. This implies that there will be areas 
where the profits associated to the not invest strategy are superior to those related to the investment 
strategy. It follows that there exist combinations of the values of the parameters t and  F  allowing 
simultaneously both for RFDI and IIT as Nash Equilibria of the game.   
Given the firms’ payoff structure, as well in the range of trade costs  398 . 354 . ≤ < t  it is obtained 
that  [ ] 31 . , , , 2 , , , 1 ) ( , 0 = Π = Π ∈ t
IN
tr Asy BC A
IN
tr Asy BC B F : depending both on the size of sunk costs and the 
values of t, different equilibria can arise. In particular, within this range, asymmetric regimes of 
international business may be possible.      20 
   21 
Instead, for  412 . ≥ t , given the switch toward the high wage strategy by unions in the firms’ 
strategy profile  ) ; ( N N , profits are no more affected by trade costs. The relevant range of sunk 
costs is now represented by  
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implying  [ ] ) ; ( , 0 , , , 2 , , , 1
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nt Asy BC A
IN
nt Asy BC B F Π Π ∈ . The firms’ strategy selection depends on the wage 
level set by unions and on the sunk costs of undertaking FDI.
17
The broad picture relatively to the productive structures arising in equilibrium is quite complex. 
This is so because of the interdependence of 
   
t and  F , as it is possible to see from Figure 5, which 
reports graphically the results in Table 2 in the  ) , ( t F -space (changes in F  may shrink or enlarge 
the area where a particular productive structure is given). Additionally, these parameters in turn 
affect both directly and indirectly the union wage strategy selection. Nonetheless, some general 
observations can be addressed. First, provided that to invest is a feasible strategic option as 
assumed, autarky will never arise as equilibrium of the game. The reason resides in the fact that 
firms,  by having the opportunity to undertake FDI, can elude the potential unions’ threat of 
adopting a high-wage strategy in case of a non investment choice.  
Second, it is possible that a RFDI regime could be given not only when trade costs are sufficiently 
high (the so called tariff jumping argument), but also when trade costs are low and IIT is a likely 
outcome; that is, reciprocal investments could simply arise for strategic reasons. The explanation 
may be the following: increasing economic integration in form of a reduction in trade barriers could 
make the investment option more attractive.  In fact, differentiating  it is obtained that 
[ ] 31 ,. 0 0 ) ( , , , 2 , , , 1 ∈ ∀ < ∂ Π = Π ∂ t t
IN
tr Asy BC A
IN
tr Asy BC B : a reduction in trade costs raises foreign profits, 
enlarging the set for which to invest is a feasible strategy.  
Third, for intermediate values of trade costs, either RFDI or asymmetric regimes could be given: if 
sunk costs are not too large, to make a foreign investment seems to play an increasing fundamental 
role as firm strategic choice. Finally, for t sufficiently high, the tariff jumping argument is valid: in 
order to avoid prohibitive trade cost levels, to invest becomes the only feasible alternative to start 
international activities. These results could be summarized in the following proposition. 
   
Proposition 2: Under Restrictions 1 and 2, and unions acting competitively in the labor market, to 
invest is the more expected strategic option for firms, unless the value of the parameters t and F  is 
sufficiently low. Hence, RFDI is the more likely regime that could be given, but for a high degree of 
economic integration, IIT is expected to occur.  
 
The next section will investigate if the collusive behavior by unions in the labor market could 
eventually alter these findings, and if this is the case, in which measure.    
 
3. Union Collusion 
 
In this model collusion stands for unions to find an agreement to fix a wage that maximizes their 
joint union utility (efficient union collusion). Generally this agreement determines a wage level 
higher than the Bertrand competitive one. While in symmetric situations this kind of collusion 
seems to be a plausible strategy, in asymmetric cases there are various reasons that may hinder it. 
Coordination problems are clearly more complex when agents have divergent preferences respect to 
collusive outcomes. Furthermore, asymmetry may also deter the sustainability of collusion. In fact, 
(i) it may be more difficult to react against the economic agent having a marginal advantage in case 
of deviation from the collusive agreement, and (ii) the economic agent who is in a position of  
                                                 
17 In reality, trade costs, affecting unions’ utility and their optimal wage strategy, indirectly influence firm profits.     22 
Figure 5: Productive Structures in Equilibrium with Union Bertrand Competition  
 
 
advantage in terms of marginality may gain relatively  more from deviating in the short-term 
(Miklos-Thal, 2008). Nevertheless, in this paper it will be considered the maximization of the joint 
union utility  also in asymmetric regimes. The reason is dictated by the need of giving a 
homogeneous definition of collusion all over the possible firms’ strategy profiles. This will allow to 
compare how collusive behavior could alter the strategic choice of firms related to the beginning of 
international activities, and consequently the specification of game equilibria in stage 1 respect to 
the union competitive case.  
Collusion could be implemented in a repeated game. With four players the set of possible strategy 
combinations is clearly very huge. It follows that a very simplified assumption is needed: for the 
purposes of this paper, it is assumed that firms have not the possibility to collude. Although in a 
repeated game framework this is a very strong assumption (because also firms have incentives to 
reach a collusive agreement), it is retained in order to isolate exclusively union collusive behavior; 
but this hypothesis could be also seen as if there is a sufficiently effective Antitrust Authority able 
to avoid tacit collusion in the product market.  
 
3.1 Union Collusion when firms do not invest 
 
This subsection analyzes the case of unions’ collusive behavior in the second stage of the game 
when firms decide not to adopt the investment strategy. Unions may collude in two different ways: 
1) to set a very high wage level such that each firm does not find profitable to produce for exports, 
inducing them to remain in an autarky position; 2) to collude selecting a wage level which allows 
firms for intra-industry trade. As Straume (2002) shows, in the first case it is obtained that if 
268 . 3 2 ≈ − > t , the wage level (and consequently the values of all other variables) will be the 
same of the monopoly in autarky regime, that is  2 1 , = M C w . In the second case, if  3 2 − ≤ t , the 
unions’ maximization problem leads to  
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allowing for IIT. With subsequent substitutions of equation (42), optimal quantities for domestic 
production and for export are obtained 
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Once optimal quantities are derived, further substitutions then allow to evaluate union utility, firm 
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3.2 International Production with Union Collusive Behavior 
 
Now it is considered the case that unions, also in presence of multinational activities, are able to 
sign a collusive agreement to raise their wage levels, capturing a greater share of the rent gained in 
the product market by firms. Contrary to the case of IIT, when both firms decide to undertake a 
direct investment the joint union utility is not affected by trade costs. Hence, when firms are in a 
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where the lower script indicates “Collusive in RFDI”. Maximization of equation (43) yields  
 
2 1 , = RFDI C w                        (44) 
 
and, after substitution, it is obtained that optimal duopoly quantities are  
6 1 2 2 1 1 = = = = A B B A x y y x . 
 
Notice that, although the wage level is identical to the wage in autarky, now production and 
employment levels are higher due to the fact that each firm has planted a branch in the other 
country. With the equilibrium quantities and the collusive wage are then derived all the other 
relevant values for union utility level,  firm profits,  consumer surplus  and national welfare, 















3.3 Asymmetric Regimes with Union Collusive Behavior 
 
Consider now the case of collusive behavior between unions in asymmetric regimes. From now one 
of the two firm does not invest, joint union utility could be affected by trade costs depending on the   24 
strategic choice made by the union which operates within the firm which does not invest. Suppose, 
like in the previous subsection, that Firm 1 does not invest while Firm 2 undertakes FDI. In stage 2 
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where the lower script indicates “Collusive in Asymmetric regime”. In the maximization problem, 
the constraint simply states that the collusive wage could be either at a level that allows Firm 1 to 
export (Trade) or to induce Firm 1 to produce only domestically (No Trade). Maximization of 
equations (45) yields the following collusive wage levels  
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When the level of trade costs is sufficiently low, namely for  265 . ≤ t , the union organized within 
the firm which has chosen not to invest will find suitable to establish a collusive agreement with the 
other firm-level union at a wage level such that exports are possible. Instead, for higher values of 
trade costs, the same union will reach a higher utility with an agreement on a wage rate which 
induces the firm to produce only domestically. It should be noted that: 1) by colluding in 
asymmetric regimes, unions will get a wage outcome higher than the IIT regime; 2) since the wage 
rate is commonly fixed, contrary to asymmetric regimes with international rivalry in the labor 
markets trade liberalization now leads both unions to set higher wages; and finally, 3) union 
collusion allowing for international activities in asymmetric regimes requires a slightly higher 
degree of economic integration in the form of lower trade barriers with respect to IIT, reversing the 
results obtained under union competition.    
Putting equation (46) into quantities expressions it is obtained that in asymmetric regimes involving 
both types of international activities production levels are given by 
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18 Union rents components in national welfare in this case is given by the proportional share of joint utility related to 
workers that operate in each country.    25 
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Instead, using equation (47) it is obtained that in the other asymmetric regime, with the firm not 
investing which produces only for its domestic market, quantities are given by 
 
6 1 2 1 = = A A x x ;  4 1 2 = B y . 
 
With the wage level in (47) and the optimal quantities produced under union collusion, profits, 
union utilities
  and the value of the other relevant variable are finally obtained 
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3.4 First stage: Firms’ Selection Strategy and Game Equilibria under Union Collusion 
 
The determination of the collusive wage levels is achievable in each potential configuration of 
productive activities that could arise. After that it is possible to go back to the first stage of the game 
in order to investigate if union collusion is able to alter the strategy choice by firms (and eventually 
in which manner) respect to the competitive framework. As well as in the previous situation, game 
equilibria will depend both upon trade and investment costs, and wage levels. 
Firms’ payoffs in the RFDI regime obviously do not depend on trade costs. Instead, when both 
firms adopt a strategy implying no investment (the strategy profile  ) ; ( NI NI ), IIT is supported in 
pure strategies as Nash equilibrium under union collusion if the trade cost levels are below 
268 . 3 2 ≈ − ≤ t  (lower than those obtained with union competition,  31 . ≤ t ), while for higher 
values unions will set a wage rate inducing exclusively home production.  
Like in the competitive framework, also in asymmetric regimes, depending on t, two different 
configurations are possible. When  265 . ≤ t , the union organized within the firm not investing will 
collude to a wage level which allows to export. For higher trade costs, the same union would like to 
collude to a wage which consents only domestic production. Similarly to the strategy profile 
) ; ( NI NI , in asymmetric regimes as well union collusion, compared to the competitive union 
situation  ( 398 . ≤ t ), lowers the threshold of trade barriers allowing for international activities. 
Although at different levels in different ranges of trade costs, collusive wages are well defined for 
each productive structure all over the interval of existence of the parameter  t. Consequently, to 
derive game equilibria, only the following restriction on the values of the parameter F  is required. 
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The economic meaning of Restriction 3 is similar to that of Restriction 2: the profits’ scale under 
union collusion generated in the foreign market by the firm which invests must be larger than the 
magnitude of the fixed costs to make the foreign investment.  
Taking in consideration the results presented in the previous subsections and given Restrictions 3, it 
follows that firms’ payoff structure in stage 1 of the game under union collusive behavior is given 
by   26 
Figure 6: Firm Profits under Union Collusion in Stage 1 
 
 
Note: bold lines represent profit functions associated to the FDI strategy. 
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3) for  268 . ≥ t ,  
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The situation is depicted in Figure 6, while game equilibria are reported in Table 3.  
In the range  265 . 0 ≤ ≤ t , it is obtained that the size of sunk costs must be  
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that is, profit levels associated to the investment strategy in asymmetric regimes are higher than 
those when both firms invest, with the equality holding only for  0 = t . It follows that the relevant 
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For  0 = F  (direct investment no costly) and with union collusion, it is obtained that in the range 
265 . 0 ≤ ≤ t , RFDI is the Nash equilibrium of the game. The presence of positive fixed costs for 
the direct investment will alter this situation: profits associated to the investment strategy lowers. 
Consequently, there will be combinations of the parameters t and  F  allowing for ranges where 
profits associated to the “not invest” strategy are superior to those associated to the investment 
strategy, giving rise to different possible productive structure in equilibrium. 
Instead, in the range of trade cost levels between  268 . 265 . ≤ < t , it is given that  
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implying that sunk costs have to belong to the interval  [ ] 36 1 , 0 ∈ F  since 
IN
nt Asy C B
II
C B , , , 1 , 1 Π = Π  
(exactly the same applies for Firm 2). Depending both on t and  F , also in this range of trade cost 
levels different productive structure can arise as Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Conversely, for  268 . ≥ t , given the change by unions toward the high wage strategy in the 
) ; ( NI NI  profile, firm profits are no more affected by trade costs. The relevant range of sunk costs 
is still represented by  [ ] 36 1 , 0 ∈ F  and the firms’ strategy selection depends exclusively on the 
wage level set by unions and on the scale of sunk costs of the foreign investment. It is found that in 
this range RFDI is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Like in the situation of unions acting competitively, game equilibria under union collusive behavior 
obviously still depend on t andF . What is the role played by union collusion? 
If there is no investment by firms, in a one-shot game the existence of labor unions lowers the 
prohibitive level of trade costs such that IIT is supported as Nash equilibrium of the game, making 
this configuration less likely (Naylor, 1999). Instead, in a repeated game framework, if firms have 
the possibility to collude, this result is reversed: IIT is a more likely equilibrium (Straume, 2002). 
But if firms cannot collude, the effect of wage collusion is simply to lower the threshold level of 
trade costs allowing for IIT: thus, the presence of unions acting collusively when firms cannot 
makes the conditions for IIT as outcome of the repeated game more stringent.  
Additionally union collusion, rising wages and squeezing foreign profits, makes the investment 
option by firm less feasible: while in asymmetric regimes a higher degree of economic integration is 
required to consent international activities for the firm which has not chosen to invest, in RFDI 
regime (because of an inferior level of profits generated in the foreign market), to invest becomes a 
practicable option only for lower magnitudes of sunk costs. Therefore, under the assumption of 
firms that do not collude in the repeated game, unions’ collusive behavior requires, as expected, a 
higher degree of economic integration to allow international activities. 
Concerning the productive structures arising in equilibrium, looking at the results in Table 3 
(reported graphically in Figure 7), and comparing them with those in Table 2 and Figure 5, it should 
be noted that also under union collusive behavior, unless sunk costs are sufficiently high, the 
autarky regime will never occur as sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game.  
 
Figure 7: Productive Structures in Equilibrium with Union Collusion  
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Also under union collusion there are some parameter combinations for which multiple equilibria 
might be given. However, differently from the union competitive case, these equilibria may arise 
for lower degrees of economic integration (higher values of sunk and trade costs), and they seem to 
be relatively less probable to take place. With respect to union competition, RFDI regime is less 
likely to arise for low values of trade costs ( 265 . ) 2 5 8 ( 7 2 0 ≈ − ≤ ≤ t ), while either IIT and 
asymmetric regimes become more probable: not to invest is the most feasible strategy and hence IIT 
is the most likely outcome to be given. Instead, for sufficiently high values of t (which are however 
lower respect to the case of competing unions), to invest becomes once again the most expected 
strategic option for firms (the tariff jumping argument). These findings can be summed up in the 
subsequent proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. When unions collude, under Restrictions 3 and the assumption of firms not colluding 
in the repeated game, like in the case of unions acting competitively, not to invest is the more 
expected strategic option for firms for low values of trade costs while the investment strategy is 
more expected for higher trade cost  levels. Hence, IIT and RFDI are the more likely regimes that 
could be given under union collusive behavior, but RFDI is given for a wider range of trade cost 
levels. 
 
The analysis conducted until now shows that union collusion somewhat alters the possible 
productive structures’ equilibria. But at this point, a question immediately rises: is it collusion most 
of the time profitable for labor unions? Setting apart from the discussion the asymmetric cases 
(which are the minority), and focusing exclusively on the symmetric regimes, whenever for a given 
combination of sunk and trade costs the productive structure equilibrium is the same both under 
union competition and collusion, the answer is obviously yes. The same holds true when at mixed 
equilibria under union competition, correspond a symmetric equilibrium in collusion (or the 
reverse). But it may occur that for other parameter configurations, these equilibria will differ. 
Indeed, overlapping Figures 5 and 7, it can be found that there exist a range of sunk costs in the 
) , ( t F -space, precisely for  ] 0239 ,. 0176 [. ∈ F , where for some ranges of trade costs under union 
competition, IIT is given as equilibrium, while under union collusion RFDI takes place. A specific 
numerical example may help to better illustrate the point. 
Consider the case that the sunk cost for the investment is 02 . = F . At this level, under union 
competitive behavior, IIT is given all over the range of trade costs  31 . 0 ≤ ≤ t , while under union 
collusion RFDI will arise for  265 . 146 . ≤ ≤ t . Therefore, in the latter range the union utility levels 
under the two diverse equilibria are directly comparable, and it can be easily shown that  
] 265 ,. 146 [. 27 ) 2 ( 6 1 ,
2
, ∈ ∀ Ω = − > = Ω t t IIT BC RFDI C .  
Although this discussion does absolutely not represent an exhaustive answer, it may give some 
insights on the fact that collusion, at least in the majority of the cases, seems to be profitable for 
unions. But, is collusive behavior always given? Is collusion in wages by labor unions in the 
repeated game likely to be sustained for each configuration of productive structures in equilibrium? 
These questions are addressed in the next section, where the sustainability of union collusion will be 
explored in all the potential equilibria that can arise under union collusive behavior. 
 
4.  Sustainability of Unions’ Collusive Agreement  
 
This section investigates the sustainability of union collusion in the possible productive structures’ 
configurations that may arise as equilibrium of the game. Each union will capture an instantaneous 
utility gain by unilaterally deviating from the collusive strategy. Deviation implies a reduction in 
wage levels which will induce the firm to act more aggressively in the foreign market either by 
increasing exports in case of trade, or production in the foreign plant in case of FDI.   30 
It is assumed that both unions adopt the trigger strategy, that is, a strategy with a Nash reversion to 
the competitive strategy whenever there is deviation from the collusive wage-setting, although this 
is not the optimal form of punishment (Abreu, 1986). The collusive agreement between unions is 
possible to be sustained if it is supported by some realistic threats, such that the one-period gain 
from cheating will be lower than the discounted expected value from punishment. As previously 
noted, unions within the framework of this model are not able to collude in such a way to induce 
autarky positions: in fact firms, being first movers and having the investment strategy option, could 
escape at least this kind of collusive agreement. Hence, labor unions could behave collusively when 
IIT, RFDI and asymmetric regimes are given. In the symmetric cases, the discounted factor is 
identical for both unions, while asymmetric regimes will inevitably produce different discount 
factors for the two unions. Generally, the trigger strategy constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium 
in the infinitely repeated game when the following condition is satisfied  
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where 
C U  is the utility level from collusion, 
D U  is the utility level from the one-period defection 
and 
P U  the utility derived from punishment. In order to specify the relevant payoff functions it is 
necessary to make a distinction between the different sub games: in fact, depending on the specific 
configuration, punishment utility, 
P U , the collusive utility, 
C U , and the utility from deviation, 
D U , 
will differ.  
Consider first the IIT equilibrium case. When the cheating union (e.g. Union 1) deviates, the 
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where  C C w w = 2  in equation (42). This maximization problem yields the following optimal wage 
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and consequently the following union utility level 
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Inserting the relevant payoffs into (48) it is obtained that the critical discount factor is given by 
 
17 9 = δ                         (49)
   
that is, the sustainability of union collusion is independent from trade costs: a marginal reduction in  
trade cost levels will lead to a proportionate increase in both the discounted union utility obtained 
from collusion and the discounted utility from deviation, therefore maintaining unaltered the critical 
discount factor. This result is also derived in Straume (2002), and Strozzi (2007) for the case of 
perfect substitute goods.   31 
Let consider now the situation where union colludes in the RFDI regime. Here, given the absence of 
trade, the discount factor is obviously not affected by the parameter t. The union which deviates 
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where  RFDI C RFDI C w w , , 2 =  in equation (44). The maximization problem leads to the following wage  
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while the union utility level is given by   
 
16 3 = Ω
D . 
 
Further substitutions of the relevant payoffs in (48) yields to  17 9 = δ , exactly as in equation (49). 
This result is quite amazing. In fact, the expressions of the discount factor threshold are exactly the 
same for the IIT and the RFDI regimes: no matter which is the nature of the international business 
undertaken by firms, in symmetric regimes union collusion is sustainable under the identical 
condition.  
Finally, consider the case of union collusion in asymmetric regimes.
19
 
 In this case, condition (50) is 
required to be satisfied concurrently by both unions. Since the wage equilibrium in Bertrand 
competition is not the same for the two unions, it follows that, due to the asymmetric nature of the 
game, the discount factor here is not equal for unions. Referring to the situation in which Firm 1 
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and a union utility level equal to   
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where  tr Asy C tr Asy C w w , , , , 1 =  is again the wage rate in equation (46), leading to  
                                                 
19 Union collusion in the other asymmetric case, namely the situation where one firm invests while the other produces 
only domestically, as well as union collusion inducing autarky when both firms do not invest, are not investigated since 
these productive structures do not arises as Nash equilibria of the game.       32 
Figure 8: Unions’ discount factors in asymmetric regimes 
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and a union utility level equal to  
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Analytical inspection of expressions (51) and (52) leads to  0 1 > ∂ ∂ t δ  and  0 2 > ∂ ∂ t δ  in the 
relevant range  [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ t , as it is also possible to see from Figure 8: a reduction in the trade cost level 
makes collusion more sustainable. Nonetheless, further observations are needed. First, the discount 
factor threshold for both unions starts form the value of  17 9 = δ  at  0 = t , and then, as long as 
trade costs  raise, it increases: hence, efficient  union  collusion  in asymmetric regimes is more 
difficult to be sustained with respect to symmetric regimes. Second, collusion with the adoption of 
the trigger strategy may be sustained only if trade costs are sufficiently low: in fact, it can be shown 
that if  t ≤ 0475 . ,  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ δ   for both unions. Therefore some  collusion is  sustainable under 
asymmetry also when collusion is sustainable under symmetry: if economic integration is relatively 
high, collusion is sustainable also in absence of side payments between the two unions. Instead, 
when trade costs become higher, the union within the firm which invests (Union 2 in this example) 
will gain relatively more in its welfare from cheating collusion on wages in terms of higher 
employment levels, making collusion not sustainable. In these cases, as also Straume (2002) pointed 
out, the collusive asymmetric solution has to implicitly imply some transfer of utility between the 
two unions, which seems difficult to be implemented in reality. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to study optimal penal codes and the “side payments” issue between the two unions participating in   33 
the “labor market cartel”. Nonetheless, it can not be theoretically ruled out that also whereas 
collusion is unsustainable with the simple trigger strategy without side payments, more severe 
punishment schemes and the transfers between unions may make some collusion possible.  
The results of this section could be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. In symmetric regimes of firms’ international activities, union collusive behavior may 
be likely to happen and to be sustained at the same conditions, while in asymmetric regimes wage 
collusion may be sustained for low values of integration costs. If integration costs are sufficiently 
high, union collusion is not sustainable. 
 
Concluding, although its simplistic nature, the trigger strategy could serve as an intuitively and 
useful demonstration of the relative practicability of a collusive agreement between unions 
whenever the organization of productive activities is symmetrical. Instead, when asymmetric 
structures of production can arise as possible equilibria of the game, collusive agreements between 
unions can be supported only for high degrees of economic integration. Nonetheless, it appears 
unsustainable if integration costs become sufficiently high because of the different effect that trade 
costs plays on the two unions discount factors. It follows that the collusive behavior in these 
regimes suffers a lack of credibility, and a competitive wage outcome in the labor market is more 
likely to be given; in such a case, firms’ strategic choices in international activities seem to be 
affected exclusively by the investment and trade costs, while labor unions’ behavior appears to be 
unlikely to influence this decision. 
 
5. Welfare and Policy Implications  
 
Now it is possible to turn the attention on national welfare level. As it was shown in section 2.5, 
when unions act in a competitive way in the labor market, firms’ decision concerning international 
activities in correspondence of some critical ranges can switch from a no investment strategy with 
exports toward the foreign market to a direct investment strategy. It depends on the values of the 
parameters  F  and  t (and relative restrictions), In the range  31 . 0 ≤ ≤ t  either an IIT regime, a 
RFDI regime or both regimes could arise as Nash equilibria of the game. Instead, in the range 
398 . 354 . ≤ ≤ t , either RFDI or asymmetric regimes could be given as productive structures in 
equilibrium, while for  412 . ≥ t , trade costs are high enough that both firms find profitable to invest: 
RFDI is the unique configuration of international activities that is given in equilibrium.  
 
Figure 9: Welfare under Union Competition 
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Hence, national welfare function presents “jumps” and peculiarities related to the strategy that firms 
have chosen in these critical ranges, as shown in Figure 9.  
Also under union collusion, firms’  decision  concerning international activities  depends on the 
values of the parameters F  and t, and in certain intervals the strategic choice can switch from a no 
investment strategy allowing for trade to a direct investment strategy. The effect of union collusion 
can be summarized in a substantial need of a higher level of economic integration for firms to start 
international activities. In fact, under the assumptions outlined in the paper, collusion has two 
implications: 1) rising wages, firm profits shrinks both in the domestic and in the foreign market: 
specifically, profits generated in the foreign market are relevant for the firms when choose to adopt 
the investment strategy. If foreign profits lowers, it follows that to invest becomes a feasible 
strategic option only for lower magnitudes of sunk costs; 2) a lower degree of trade costs is needed 
for international trade: with respect to the competitive case, both in symmetric and asymmetric 
regimes a higher degree of economic integration (a lower level of trade costs) is required to allow 
for the firm not investing to export its production. As a consequence, when investing is a viable 
option, a RFDI regime will arise as the productive structure equilibrium of the game at lower level 
of trade costs, namely for  268 . ≥ t  (Figure 10). 
Because of the interdependence of the parameters F  and t, and of the strategic interaction between 
unions and firms’, the whole picture appears quite complex. Nonetheless, some general 
considerations could be addressed.  
First, a national government would like to preclude that an autarky regime is reached, because if 
this equilibrium is given, the welfare level is the lowest possible. How to avoid this result? The only 
way to preclude this situation is that foreign investment should be a viable strategic option for 
firms, and this could be done only for sufficiently low levels of sunk costs. To promote a direct 
investment, a national government might reduce part of these costs without necessarily subsidize 
them (excluded by assumption in this model). For example requiring no (or minimal) license fees 
for the rights to establish a plant in their own country: creating the conditions for potential direct 
investments (or, in other words, making the investment strategy a suitable alternative) will erode 
union monopoly power and avoid collusion on a wage level inducing exclusively domestic 
production.  
 
Figure 10: Welfare under Union Collusion 
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Second, even if autarky positions are prevented, this does not imply that collusive agreements for 
unions are not affordable. Once repetition is allowed in the union game, collusion in wage levels is 
plausible under certain conditions when the structures of international activities are symmetric 
while under asymmetric regimes will not arise. Both governments are interested in promoting FDI, 
but since welfare levels in IIT regime with union collusion are higher with respect to those in RFDI, 
a Pareto improving policy could be increasing economic integration promoting strong trade 
liberalization policies. 
Third, if unions in the repeated game adopt a collusive behavior, the welfare level will drastically 
decrease. The reduction will be more important as long as integration improves, and it will be 
unambiguously lower than that attained when unions act competitively, because in this case higher 
profits for firms, lower prices and hence higher surplus for consumers are given from lower wages. 
As a consequence, it appears that governments maximizing social welfare should discourage unions 
to sign collusive agreements, inducing them to act competitively, and subsequently to have a 
national government intervention implementing redistributive policies.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
This paper deals with the consequences of the process of international market integration, 
exemplified both by the reduction in trade costs and the possibility to undertake direct investment in 
a foreign country, on firms and unions’ strategic behavior. Developing a general framework, it was 
analyzed how these two aspects of economic integration could affect both firms’  decision 
concerning international business and the strategic behavior of labor unions in the labor market. The 
framework focuses  particularly on the  scope for unions’  collusive behavior,  exploring the 
relationship between wage outcomes and the nature of firms’ international activities. 
This model allows firms to undertake foreign investments, complementing and extending the basic 
two-way intra-industry trade analytical framework of Naylor (1998, 1999), and the repeated game 
version of the model of Straume (2002). Although the present model has a slight variation with 
respect to the latter work  in order to isolate exclusively  the possible outcomes due to union 
collusive behavior. 
Adopting a three-stage game, where firms are first movers and choose independently whether to 
invest in a foreign country or not to invest, and labor unions in the second stage have the possibility 
to opt between a high-low wage strategy that may, it was shown how a union’s wage strategy 
choice  will depend on the value of trade costs and how this in turns may affect the strategic 
behavior of firms. Considering the possible wage strategies of rival unions, it was characterized the 
complete set of productive structures regimes and configurations of international activities that can 
arise as sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for different combinations of wages, trade cost levels and 
sunk costs of the investment were derived. The main results are reported below. 
It was found that a first element influencing firms’ decision related to international activities is the 
amount of the fixed costs that are needed to make a FDI. An important result was that firms, by 
having the advantage of being first-movers and under the assumption, retained all over the paper, 
that to invest is a viable option, will induce in some cases the company-level unions to a moderation 
in wage demands. It was shown that, whenever a firm adopts an investment strategy to begin 
international business, unions can not choose a prohibitive wage rate that condemns either their 
workers to be priced out of the labor market or in an excessive loss of employment opportunities. 
Nevertheless, although the firms’ investment strategy may induce a wage moderation, trade unions 
with respect to IIT regime will gain a larger share of firms’ rents because of the saving in trade 
costs and : unions may welcome FDI.  
Firms’ payoffs in the sub-game characterized by the RFDI regime is influenced exclusively by 
wage levels set by unions. In the sub-game defined by the firms’ strategy profile  ) ; ( NI NI  with 
unions’ Bertrand competitive behavior, IIT is supported as Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if the 
trade cost level is below  31 . ≤ t , while for  354 . ≥ t  unions set high wages such that only domestic   36 
production may potentially arise as Nash Equilibrium. Instead, in the range  354 . 31 . < < t , there is 
no equilibrium in pure strategies. These are the results obtained in Naylor (1999). Instead, in the 
two sub-games identified by the firms’ strategy profiles  ) ; ( NI I  and  ) ; ( I NI , depending on t and 
on wage strategies, two different asymmetric regimes are possible. If  398 . ≤ t , then the company 
level union which operates within the firm not investing will set a wage level such that the firm 
would export in the other country, while for  412 . ≥ t  the union will unequivocally chose a wage 
strategy inducing only home production. In the range  412 . 398 . < < t , there is no equilibrium in 
pure strategies.   
Because of the interdependence of t,  F   and unions’ strategic behavior,  equilbria  involving 
different configurations of international activities can arise. Nonetheless, some important 
observations can be addressed. First, the autarky regime will never be given as equilibrium of the 
game. The rationale is inherent in the fact that firms, making FDI, can elude the unions’ threat of a 
high-wage strategy selection which might be given in case of no investment. Second, it is possible 
that a RFDI regime could occur also for low values of trade costs: to invest could be a viable 
strategic option for a firm not only for the tariff jumping argument, but also when IIT is a likely 
outcome. A possible explanation for this result could lie in the fact that increasing economic 
integration makes the investment option less prohibitive. Third, for intermediate values of trade 
costs, either RFDI or asymmetric regimes with a firm investing could be obtained: if the scale of 
sunk costs are not too large, the investment strategy appears to play an increasing fundamental role 
in firms’ choice related to international business. Finally, for t high enough, the tariff jumping 
argument is valid. Hence, with union acting competitively, to invest is the more expected strategic 
option for firms and RFDI is the more likely regime that could be given. 
Instead, under union collusive behavior it was obtained that in the range  268 . 0 ≤ ≤ t , depending 
both on t and  F , different productive structure can arise as Nash equilibrium of the game, and for 
some parameter combinations in small ranges also multiple equilibria may occur. Conversely, for 
268 . ≥ t , given the switch toward the high wage strategy by unions in the strategy profile 
) ; ( NI NI , firm profits are no more affected by trade costs: firms’ strategy selection depends 
exclusively on the wage level set by unions and on the size of fixed costs of the investment. Union 
collusion, rising wages over the Bertrand competitive level, shrinks foreign profits and makes the 
investment option by firm less practicable. However, in IIT and asymmetric regimes a higher 
degree of economic integration is required to consent international activities for the firm which has 
chosen not to invest. On the other hand, RFDI regime, because of lower profits generated in the 
foreign market, the investment strategy becomes a practicable option only for lower magnitudes of 
sunk costs. Nonetheless, for lower values of trade costs, IIT is more likely to arise as Nash 
equilibrium under union collusive behavior. Summarizing, union collusion requires a higher degree 
of economic integration to allow international business. 
The analysis has intuitively shown that a collusive agreement between unions is more practicable 
whenever the organization of productive activities is symmetrical, while in asymmetric regimes 
collusion is sustainable only for very high degrees of economic integration. After an analysis of the 
sustainability of union collusion some policy insights are derived. 
Given the hypothesis outlined in the model and the results obtained from the previous analysis, it 
seems that national governments efforts should be devoted in acting policies that: 1) have to avoid 
an autarky regime, making FDI a feasible option in international activities for firms; 2) support 
trade liberalization; and 3) to encourage union competitiveness, promoting subsequent welfare 
redistributive measures in each country. Nevertheless, the open question is to evaluate and establish 
the appropriate policy instruments to redistribute national welfare; this is left for future further 
research.  
It was used a very simple framework and the model presents a certain lack of robustness such as the 
use of very specific functional forms for utility, production and cost functions. However, this paper 
wants to offer a theoretical contribution in analyzing how firms’ strategic behavior concerning 
international activities, even in an area with a higher degree of integration, could be affected by   37 
union behavior. After the completion of the Single Market and the birth of the Monetary Union, as 
long as the European integration process will continue, it seems plausible that also the European 
labor market will become more and more integrated. Coordinated activities by unions in the labor 




Proof of Proposition 1. 
 
To prove proposition 1, union’s 2 payoffs related to the high wage strategy are compared with 
respect to payoffs associated to the low wage strategy.  
First, suppose that union 2 is playing a high wage strategy setting a wage rate in Region III such 
that Firm 2 cannot make a foreign investment, while Firm 1 is allowed to export. The labor demand 
function faced by union 2 is given by equation (24). Union’s 2 utility in Region III is then given by  
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For  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ t , the intercept of 
H
III RF , 2  is below or at maximum equal to the intercept of the boundary 
condition between Region I and III,  III I B , . From differentiation of both 
H
III RF , 2  and the boundary it 
is also obtained that   1 , 1 , 2 w B w RF III I
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III ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ . This two results jointly define that the 
H
III RF , 2  path 
resides entirely in Region I, where from definition the best reply function 
L
I RF , 2  assures the highest 
level of utility. In fact, it is directly obtained that in Region I the labor demand function for union 2 
is given by (24) and (25)  
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yielding the following union utility function  
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Suppose now that neither Firm 1 exports nor Firm 2 undertakes FDI. In such a case wage rates are 
no more interdependent one from the other, and hence the optimal wage is that obtained in the 
autarky case in subsection 2.2.1. It follows that  
 
2 1 2 = w  implying  8 1 , 2 = Ω
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VI                
 
Also in this case, the  2 w  path associated to the low-wage strategy resides entirely in a region, 
Region II, where FDI is still given.  The labor demand function faced by union 2 in Region II when 
it is played a low wage strategy is given by  
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and the union utility is hence represented by the following expression       
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